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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-NO PER SE DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO A HEARING OUTSIDE JURY'S PRESENCE
ON ADMISSIBILITY OF IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
-Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
Two cases arising out of the Kentucky State Courts were
consolidated for appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, per Justice Stewart, held that "[a]
judicial determination outside the presence of the jury of the
admissibility of identification evidence may often be advisa-
ble. In some circumstances, not presented here, such a deter-
mination may be constitutionally necessary. But it does not
follow that the Constitution requires a per se rule compelling
such a procedure in every case."'
Late on the night of July 20, 1974, a woman was forced
into a car by two men and driven to another location. There,
she was raped by one of the men.2 Forty-five minutes after the
abduction she was returned to her car.8 Early the next morn-
ing she reported the crime and gave a detailed description of
her assailant.' The petitioner, Summitt, was identified by the
victim two days later through photographs in police files.5
Prior to trial, Summitt moved to suppress any possible
in-court identification by the victim.e He also sought an evi-
0 1982 by Stephen Gibbs
1. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981).
2. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d 247, 249 (6th Cir. 1979).
3. Id.
4. Summitt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 548 (1977). She described him
as a white male, in his 30's, approximately five feet nine, 180 to 190 pounds, a rough
complexion, tattoos on both arms, and going by the nickname of Jimbo. Id. at 549.
5. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. at 344. The victim viewed over 1,200 "mug
shots" before identifying the defendant. Id.
6. Watkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 630 (1978). Ky. R. CriM. P. 9.78
"appears to require a hearing outside the presence of the jury, upon defendant's mo-
tion, for confession and search evidence." Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. at 358 n.14
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dentiary hearing, out of the jury's presence, on the admissibil-
ity of any possible in-court identification. Both the motion
and the request for hearing were denied.
At trial the victim made an in-court identification and
also testified about her pretrial photographic identification of
the petitioner.8
Summitt was convicted of rape and sentenced to life im-
prisonment. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Sum-
mitt's conviction, finding "no error in the trial court's refusal
to conduct a suppression hearing and no semblance of imper-
missible suggestiveness in the identification procedure."
The petitioner unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky. 10 The ruling of the District Court was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.11
On the night of January 11, 1975, three or four black
males attempted to rob a Louisville liquor store at gun point.
As one of them told the cashier, Walter Smith, that it was a
holdup, a second employee in the rear of the store, Donald
Goeing, turned toward the robbers. As he turned, the assailant
said, "I said, don't reach for anything," and shot Goeing once
in the arm and once in the heart. The men then fled.12
After the shooting, Smith and Goeing described the as-
sailant to the police. 8 Two days later Smith viewed a lineup
consisting of three men and identified the petitioner." That
(1981). FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) requires that a defendant move to suppress identifi-
cation evidence before trial. Younger v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 180, 190, n.8,
150 Cal. Rptr. 156, 161 n.8 (1978) construes CAL. EvID. CODE § 403 (West 1966) as
requiring a hearing outside the presence of the jury on contested identification
evidence.
7. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d at 249.
8. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. at 345. In addition, a police officer and the
victim's stepfather, both present at the photographic examination, testified at trial.
9. Summitt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d at 550-51.
10. The opinion of the District Court is unreported.
11. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979).
12. Watkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d at 630.
13. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d at 249. Goeing, who was shot as soon as
he turned around, could only describe the assailant as "a young, black man with a
light complexion." Smith, who had a direct look at the man, described him as "a
black man with a light complexion, thirty to thirty-five years old, and approximately
five feet, nine inches tall." Id.
14. "Watkins had a lighter complexion than either of the other two men in the
lineup .... Smith identified Watkins but admitted that he was not 'completely
sure.'" Id.
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same day, the police took the petitioner to Goeing's hospital
room where, in a "show up," Goeing identified him as the
assailant."5
Petitioner Watkins filed a pretrial motion requesting a
suppression hearing, out of the presence of the jury, on the
admissibility of the identification evidence. This motion was
denied. At trial, before the introduction of evidence, and out
of the presence of the jury, Watkins repeated his request for
an in-camera hearing." He claimed its denial would force him
to explore the circumstances of the identification in the jury's
presence, thereby reinforcing the evidence in the jury's mind
before a decision on its admissibility. His objections were
overruled. During the cross-examination of Smith and Goeing,
the circumstances surrounding the lineup and showup were
brought out.1'7 Petitioner Watkins was convicted of robbery in
the first degree and assault in the first degree. He was sen-
tenced to two twenty-year terms.1 8
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Watkins
argued that the court was constitutionally obliged to conduct
an admissibility hearing outside the jury's presence. His argu-
ment was rejected.'9
15. "Goeing identified Watkins, but at the same time he stated that 'it could
have been close enough that it could have been his twin brother, it could have been
somebody else.'" Id.
16. Watkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d at 630.
17. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. at 343. In addition to their testimony concern-
ing the lineup and showup, "Smith and Goeing admitted having seen Watkins in the
courtroom on several occasions prior to trial." Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d at
249.
18. Watkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d at 630.
19. Id. at 631.
This court stated in Ray v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 482, 483
(1977): 'Although we are of the opinion that the holding of such a hear-
ing prior to the introduction of this testimony would have been the pre-
ferred course to follow, we are not persuaded the failure to have done so
requires reversal of appellant's conviction.' We are persuaded that the
identification evidence fails to raise any impermissible suggestiveness
and the appellant was in no way prejudiced. We are further convinced
that under the 'totality of the circumstances' appellant received a fair
trial.
Id.
Since the petitioner's conviction, however, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in
Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 569 S.W.2d 150 (1978), has changed its position.
"Whenever there is a substantial basis for the claim that a forthcoming in-court iden-
tification is tainted by an improper pretrial identification procedure a suppression
hearing, if affirmatively requested should be conducted." Id. at 153.
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The United States District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky held, in denying Watkins' writ of habeas corpus,
"although pretrial suppression hearings are preferable, the
failure to hold them does not require the reversal of a convic-
tion." 0 The decision of the district court was upheld by the
court of appeals.2
1
The court of appeals consolidated the appeals of Watkins
and Summitt. The court first considered the photographic evi-
dence against Summitt. Citing the 1968 case, Simmons v.
United States,"2 the court stated that "[u]nder some circum-
stances, the use of a photographic display may enhance the
possibility of misidentification."2 The court, relying on Man-
son v. Brathwaite,'4 held that even if the photographic identi-
fication was so unreliable as to create a substantial likelihood
of misidentification, it would still be admitted if there were
sufficient indicia of reliability under the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test enumerated in Neil v. Biggers.'5
In evaluating the evidence against Watkins, the appellate
court cited Stovall v. Denno6 to substantiate its holding that
a showup is necessary in some circumstances. "A showup is
20. The District Court opinion is unreported.
21. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d at 247. The court also stated, however:
An independent hearing on the admissibility of identification evidence,
either before trial or at trial outside the presence of the jury, would re-
move the disadvantage to defendant's counsel of investigating the pro-
priety of the identification evidence in the presence of the jury. In addi-
tion, it would protect the jury from being exposed to evidence that
might subsequently be determined inadmissible.
Id. at 250.
22. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In Simmons the Court held that an in-court identifica-
tion would constitute reversible error "if the photographic identification procedure
was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification." Id. at 384.
23. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d at 252.
24. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
25. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). Neil's indicia of reliability are:
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior
description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime
and the confrontation.
Id. at 199-200.
26. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In Stovall the police conducted the same type of
showup in the victim's hospital room. Stovall held that if a pretrial identification
procedure is found to be "unnecessarily suggestive, and conducive of irreparable mis-
taken identification" it violates due process, unless it was necessary in the "totality of
the circumstances," e.g. witness' imminent death. Id. at 302.
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inherently suggestive. When only one person is presented to a
witness, there is a natural tendency for the witness to feel ob-
ligated to provide a positive identification. But in some cases
a showup becomes a necessary identification procedure ...
Given the seriousness of the wounds to Donald Goeing, a
showup was necessary in this case." 7
In ruling on the admissibility of the lineup, the court ad-
mitted it "presented a very close question." The court, how-
ever, held that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
there were sufficient indicia of reliability so "that there was no
substantial likelihood of misidentification."' 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" to consider the
petitioners' claim that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment requires a state court "to conduct a hear-
ing outside the presence of the jury whenever a defendant
contends that a witness' identification of him was arrived at
improperly."30 The Court ruled against the petitioners, but
acknowledged that "[t]he prudence of such a hearing has been
emphasized by many decisions in the Courts of Appeals, most
of which have in various ways admonished trial courts to use
that procedure." 1
The Court rejected the petitioners' contention that their
case was analogous to Jackson v. Denno.82 In Jackson the
Court declared unconstitutional a New York State procedure
which allowed a jury to first determine the voluntariness of a
defendant's confession, and upon finding it involuntary, disre-
gard the confession in its deliberations. The Jackson Court
adopted a procedure requiring the trial judge to indepen-
dently decide the issue of voluntariness, and held that the
jury should not hear any confession found to be inadmissible.
The petitioners claimed that Jackson established a per se due
process right to a hearing outside the presence of the jury
whenever the voluntariness of a confession was at issue. The
petitioners then drew an analogy between a Jackson confes-
sion hearing and the necessity of a hearing where the reliabil-
ity of identification evidence has been questioned. The Court
27. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d at 252.
28. Id. at 253.
29. Watkins v. Sowders, 445 U.S. 926 (1980).
30. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. at 342.
31. Id. at 345.
32. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
1982]
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rejected this analogy, but noted that "[tihe Court in Jackson
did reject the usual presumption that a jury can be relied
upon to determine issues according to the trial judge's in-
structions ... ."83 The Court concluded, however, that a
jury's inability to understand society's aversion to the reliance
upon a true but forced confession was a "special considera-
tion" that forced Jackson to depart from the presumption
that a jury will follow instructions. The Watkins Court found
that there were no "special considerations" in the present
case, as there were in Jackson.3 4 The Court, citing Manson v.
Brathwaite,85 concluded that it was the reliability of identifi-
cation evidence that determines its admissibility "[aind the
proper evaluation of evidence under the instructions of the
trial judge is the very task our system must assume juries can
perform.""
In adopting this analysis, however, the Court overlooks
the fact that hearings on the admissibility of search and
seizure evidence are always held outside the presence of the
jury, in spite of the obvious reliability of such evidence. As
Justice Brennan points out in his dissent, the Court ignores
the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification. 83 The
Supreme Court first dealt with this unreliability in the famous
trilogy of cases, United States v. Wade,88 Gilbert v. Califor-
33. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. -at 347.
34. In his dissent, Justice Brennan cites other language in Jackson that under-
mines the distinction drawn by the majority, "[TJhe Fourteenth Amendment forbids
the use of involuntary confessions . . . because of the probable unreliability of confes-
sions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive." 449 U.S. at 351.
35. 432 U.S. at 113-14.
36. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. at 347. In his dissent, Justice Brennan asserts
"To expect a jury to engage in the collective mental gymnastic of segregating and
ignoring such testimony upon instructions is utterly unrealistic." Id. at 663.
37. Id. at 351-52.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111-12 (1977) emphasized this
troublesome characteristic of such evidence:
'The driving force behind United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), Gilbert v. California 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall, all de-
cided on the same day, was the Court's concern with the problems of
eyewitness identification. Usually the witness must testify about an en-
counter with a total stranger under circumstances of emergency or emo-
tional distress. The witness' recollection of the stranger can be distorted
easily by the circumstances or by later actions of the police.'
Id. at 351. See infra note 51.
38. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Wade recognized the dangers inherent in eyewitness
identification:
The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well known; the annals of
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nia,9 and StovaU v. Denno."° Manson v. Brathwaite,4" sup-
ported by the same majority as the instant case, acknowl-
edged: "Thus Wade and its companion cases reflect the
concern that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless
that evidence has aspects of reliability."'42
The Court, apparently recognizing the frailty of its at-
tempts to distinguish Jackson, tried to bolster the opinion by
asserting that cross-examination by defense counsel will ex-
pose any possible unreliability of the identification evidence
to the jury. Petitioners, however, argued against the use of
cross-examination in an admissibility hearing in front of the
jury. They relied on a passage from Wade'2 to substantiate
their claim that the presence of the jury deters a full explora-
tion of any impropriety, since any dwelling on the identifica-
tion reinforces it in the jury's mind. This argument was sum-
marily dismissed by the Court. "A 'predicament,' if one
chooses to call it that, is always presented when a lawyer de-
cides on cross-examination to ask a question that may pro-
criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification .... A
major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice
from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent
in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspects to wit-
nesses for pretrial identification. . . .Suggestion can be created inten-
tionally or unintentionally in many subtle ways.
Id. at 228-29.
This suggestion may lead a witness to think that the police believe that "this is
the man," it may also tempt an uncertain witness to make a positive identification
which he is very unlikely to admit as error later on. As a hedge against these
problems the Court held there to be a sixth amendment right to counsel at all post-
indictment confrontations. Id. at 236-37.
39. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). The Court held in Gilbert that where the Wade right to
counsel had been violated, testimony concerning the confrontation (lineup or showup)
was per se excluded as was any in-court identification not proven free from the taint
of the prior identification.
40. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See supra note 26.
41. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
42. Id. at 112.
43. The petitoners referred to:
[T]he predicament in which Wade's counsel found himself-realizing
that possible unfairness at the lineup may be the sole means of attack
against the unequivocal courtroom identification, and having to probe in
the dark in an attempt to discover and reveal unfairness, while bolster-
ing the government witness' courtroom identification by bringing out
and dwelling upon his prior identification.
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. at 348, (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
240-41 (1967)). The court of appeals in Summitt also acknowledged the existence of
this predicament. See supra note 21.
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duce an answer unfavorable to his client."" Justice Brennan,
the author of Wade, takes issue with the ability of cross-ex-
amination to purge inadmissible identification evidence from
jurors' minds, saying: "At best, cross-examination might di-
minish the weight the jury accords to the inadmissible
evidence. ,,45
The Court concludes its opinion with little guidance. In
cases dealing with eyewitness identification, "[a] judicial de-
termination outside the presence of the jury of the admissibil-
ity of identification evidence may often be advisable. In some
circumstances, not presented here, such a determination may
be constitutionally necessary. ' 4 6 Prior to this decision, nine of
the eleven circuits had either required or recommended an ad-
missibility hearing out of the jury's presence. 7 Rather than
unify the various approaches of the appellate courts into one
standard procedure, the Watkins Court has left trial judges
with no guidance as to what "circumstances" will trigger due
process, thus necessitating a separate hearing. The Court's ap-
parent adoption of a case by case approach, leaving the issue
to the discretion of the trial judge, appears to be yet another
source of appeals, remand hearings, hearings on motions col-
laterally attacking convictions and retrials.4 1 This potential
litigation might be avoided by adoption of one of the stan-
dards put forth in the various court of appeals decisions. 9
44. 449 U.S. at 349.
45. Id. at 357.
46. Id. at 349.
47. Id. at 358-59 n.14. The Supreme Court of California, in People v. Floyd, 1
Cal. 3d 694, 464 P.2d 64, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1970), held that "[a] hearing outside the
jury's presence is required only where there is some factual conflict concerning the
fairness of the lineup." Id. at 712, 464 P.2d at 75, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 619. See also
People v. Martin, 2 Cal. 3d 822, 834, 471 P.2d 29, 38, 87 Cal. Rptr. 709, 716 (1970);
Younger v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 180, 190, 150 Cal. Rptr. 156, 161 n.8
(1978); People v. Rodriguez, 68 Cal. App. 3d 874, 881, 137 Cal. Rptr. 594, 597 (1977);
People v. Enos, 34 Cal. App. 3d 25, 38, 109 Cal. Rptr. 876, 886 (1973); People v.
Faulkner, 28 Cal. App. 3d 384, 391, 104 Cal. Rptr. 625, 629 (1972); People v. Williams,
11 Cal. App. 3d 1156, 1162, 90 Cal. Rptr. 409, 412 (1970); People v. Rodriquez, 10 Cal.
App. 3d 18, 30, 88 Cal. Rptr. 789, 796 (1970).
48. For an excellent discussion of associated problems, see Solomon v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1306, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1969):
[W]here a timely and sufficient motion is made to suppress identifica-
tion testimony on the ground it has been tainted by pretrial photo-
graphic identification procedures, it must be heard and determined by
the court outside the jury's presence in the same manner as any other
motion to suppress evidence alleged to be inadmissible because unlaw-
[Vol. 22
WATKINS V. SOWDERS
In adopting this position, the Court overlooked the
weight of legal opinion,50 the scientifically documented unreli-
ability of eyewitness testimony,51 and the powerful impact
that eyewitness testimony has on a jury.2
Watkins continues the recent trend of narrowing previous
decisions which protected criminal defendants from improper
eyewitness identification procedures.2 Considering Justice
Brennan's persuasive dissent and the previous rulings of the
appellate courts, many states may now under their state con-
stitutions adopt a procedure that mandates a separate hearing
outside the presence of the jury on the issue of admissibility




50. See supra note 47.
51. See, e.g., E. Lorrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); A. YARMEY, THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); N. SOBEL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION:
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS (1972); P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES (1965); O'Connor, "That's the Man": A Sobering Study of Eyewit-
ness Identification and the Polygraph, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1974). See also Peo-
ple v. Anderson, 44 Mich. App. 222, 205 N.W.2d 81 (1972).
52. See E. Lorrus, supra note 51, at 8-19; P. WALL, supra note 51, at 19-23.
53. See Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers; The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade
Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN L. REV. 1097 (1974).
54. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the
Day of the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Note, The New Federalism:




CERTIFICATION IN CLASS ACTION SUITS-SOME AN-
TAGONISM WITHIN THE CLASS IS ACCEPT-
ABLE-Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., 29 Cal. 3d 462,
692 P.2d 23, 174 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1981).
In a class action suit, the trial court must determine the
type and degree of conflict within a class prior to certification
of the class.1 This rule guarantees an adequate representation
of the class by the named plaintiffs.' In Richmond v. Dart In-
dustries, Inc.,3 the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its
position of allowing some antagonism to exist within a certifi-
able class.4
In Dart, the plaintiffs and appellants were a group con-
sisting of 242 past and present owners of recreational home-
sites in the Tahoe Donner Subdivision located near Truckee,
0 1982 by Ernie Benck
1. City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 453, 525 P.2d 701, 705,
115 Cal. Rptr. 797, 801 (1974) (approving use of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) which pro-
vides: "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained."); La
Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 871, 489 P.2d 1113, 1116-17, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849, 852-53 (1971); Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 1006, 1010-11, 117 Cal. Rptr. 485, 487-88 (1974). See generally 3 E. WrrKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Pleading § 180(c) (2d ed. Supp. 1981). This determination,
however, is preliminary and may be modified or reversed by the trial court at a later
date. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977-78, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 809-10 (1971). It is to be based upon the facts and circumstances of each
case on a case by case basis. Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 574, 587, 283 P.2d
704, 713 (1955). Responsibility for the decision is, therefore, properly with the trial
court. Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 37 Cal. App. 3d 193, 198, 112
Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1974). The policy of the California courts is to allow class actions
to proceed wherever possible through the initial certification proceedings and, there-
fore, beyond the pleading stage. In this way, a determination of adequate representa-
tion can be based on the merits at a later date. Beckstead v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.
App. 3d 780, 783, 98 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1971); E. WrrKIN, supra § 179. For a similar
policy in the federal courts, see Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.R.D. 629, 632
(7th Cir. 1940); Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Va. 1972);
Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Doglow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
.2. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940); Chance v. Superior Court, 58
Cal. 2d 275, 289, 373 P.2d 849, 858, 23 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769 (1962).
3. 29 Cal. 3d 462, 629 P.2d 23, 174 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1981).
4. Chance v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 275, 289, 373 P.2d 849, 857, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 761, 769 (1972); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 706-07, 433 P.2d 732,
740-41, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 732-33 (1967).
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California.' They primarily alleged that the subdivider's plans
for necessary services such as water and sewage disposal were
inadequate and less than promised. Defendant and respon-
dent, Dart Industries, was the developer. The development
contained approximately 6,000 lots, and approximately 2,600
were sold at the time the action was brought.7 Plaintiffs' mo-
tion for certification was denied by the trial court after the
Tahoe Donner Association, an intervening group with some
homesite owners as members, demonstrated that 266 of 325
homeowners who responded to a survey were satisfied with
the services of the defendant.8 Additional antagonism within
the class was shown by the defendant through the testimony
of a homeowner which indicated that at least one class mem-
ber sought relief incompatible with that sought by the repre-
sentative plaintiffs. An appeal was granted 0 and the supreme
court unanimously reversed the denial of certification, holding
that the denial was an error of law.1
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Bird emphasized that
dissidents within a group should not prevent the other class
members from using the class action device. The dissidents'
view could be protected and asserted by the use of such proce-
dures as intervention or the creation of sub-classes. "To rule
otherwise would eliminate a substantial number of class ac-
tion suits in this state.' 2 The Chief Justice reasoned not only
that the rights of absent class members would be protected in
the instant case, but that differing viewpoints within a given
class could be of great value in a class suit. "Inclusion will
have the secondary effect of giving the trier of fact more infor-
mation which should ultimately result in a more informed
5. 29 Cal. 3d at 466 n.1, 629 P.2d at 25 n.1, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 517 n.1.
6. Id. at 466 & n.3, 629 P.2d at 25 & n.3, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 517 & n.3. In addi-
tion to violations of the Business and Professions Code, the plaintiffs pleaded com-
mon law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, failure of consideration, unjust enrich-
ment, and breach of trust. Coupled with the failure in planning adequate water
supply and sewage treatment facilities, the complaint also alleged failure to plan for
adequate recreational facilities and maintenance.
7. Id. at 466, 629 P.2d at 25, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
8. Id. at 468, 629 P.2d at 27, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
9. Id. at 477, 629 P.2d at 32, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
10. Courts hold that the effect of denying certification is identical to that of a
final judgment; therefore, it is an appealable order or judgment. Daar v. Yellow Cab
Co., 67 Cal. 2d at 698-99, 433 P.2d at 735-36, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
11. 29 Cal. 3d at 479, 629 P.2d at 34, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
12. Id.
548 [Vol. 22
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decision."'"
Turning to the facts of the case, the court found that the
intervenor's evidence of an antagonism within the class was
not sufficient to show "overwhelming disapproval of the law-
suit within the class which would defeat the purpose of class
adjudication. ' 14 The survey indicated that only six percent of
a class of four thousand opposed the suit.15 Additionally, the
court observed that the intervening homeowners association
was largely under the control of defendant Dart." The lan-
guage of the questionnaire also appeared to the court to be
less than objective, and comments attached to the flyers by
those responding brought the conclusiveness of the question-
naire results into serious doubt.1 7
The trial court relied upon Shulman v. Ritzenberg s to
test the degree of antagonism which should be tolerated. In
Shulman, a finding of any antagonism was sufficient to deny
certification. 9 On appeal, however, the Dart court held that
Shulman was not the proper test. It distinguished the denial
of certification in Shulman, where the class size was small
enough to permit joinder of all plaintiffs.'0
The Dart court applied the test set out in Fanucchi v.
Coberly- West Co." In Fanucchi, one-third of the class did not
13. Id. at 474, 629 P.2d at 30, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
14. Id. at 474-75, 629 P.2d at 31, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
15. Id. at 475, 629 P.2d at 31, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
16. Id. at 467-68, 475, 629 P.2d at 26, 31, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 518, 523.
17. Id. Comments printed in the questionnaire accused the plaintiffs of damag-
ing the subdivision project and praised the defendant's performance. Some of the
returned flyers did not have any response, while others sought more information.
18. 47 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1969).
19. "In order for a party to fairly and adequately protect the interests of a class,
he may not hold interests which conflict with those of the class whom he would re-
present." Id. at 207.
20. Id. at 208-09. Note that the Dart court apparently side-stepped a discussion
of why the class size in Shulman became so small that joinder was no longer imprac-
ticable. Forty-seven of the approximately fifty-three members filed affidavits indicat-
ing that they wished to opt out of the suit. Immediately prior to stating that joinder
was then possible, the Shulman court concluded "that plaintiff's interests are antago-
nistic at least to the interests of the forty-seven affiants and in conflict with this vast
majority of his fellow joint venture members. Thus we hold that plaintiff cannot
fairly and adequately protect them as members of the class he would represent, the
essential prerequisite of Rule 23(a)(4)." Id. at 208 (emphasis added). The decision not
to certify turned upon what the Dart court would have termed "overwhelming disap-
proval of the lawsuit within the class." See 29 Cal. 3d at 474-75, 629 P.2d at 31, 174
Cal. Rptr. at 523.
21. 151 Cal. App. 2d 72, 311 P.2d 33 (1957).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
wish to participate in the class suit. These class members were
allowed to opt out of the suit or simply to refrain from par-
taking in any gains the representative plaintiffs might acquire
for the class through the litigation.2 This alternative seems
available to class members in the instant case who are satis-
fied with the services of the defendant. Substantial federal au-
thority exists as well to bolster a decision allowing the plain-
tiffs in Dart to go forward.'8
The court's logic was strained, however, in its use of Heb-
bard v. Colgroue24 as further precedent for its decision.' The
Hebbard court decided while "[tihere is no set number re-
quired as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class ac-
tion, ' 6 the case involved such a small number of plaintiffs
that joinder was nearly possible.27 In support of certification
and its statement regarding the numbers requirement, the
Hebbard court went on to cite the case of Bowles v. Superior
Court' which involved a class with only ten members, strik-
ingly similar to the class size in Shulman. A sufficient number
of California cases exist which are equally on point with the
opting out alternative of Fanucchi, and more readily distin-
guishable from the joinder test of Shulman.'
While the court rightly held that a finding of no antago-
nism was not a prerequisite to certification,30 serious questions
remain as to the amount of antagonism which can be tolerated
22. Id. at 82, 311 P.2d at 39.
23. Rodriquez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 51 (5th Cir. 1974);
Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop., 395 F.2d 420 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 913 (1973); Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Va. 1972);
Merit Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 16 F.R.Serv. 2d 543 (D.D.C. 1972); Turnoff Drug
Distribs. Inc. v. N.Y. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 51
F.R.D. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins. Co. of America, 43 F.R.D.
169, 174 (D.S.D. 1967). See also 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §
1120(q), at 224 (1977).
24. 28 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 105 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1972).
25. 29 Cal. 3d at 472, 629 P.2d at 29, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
26. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 1030, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
27. Id.
28. 44 Cal. 2d 574, 283 P.2d 704 (1955).
29. Cases which discuss the alternative of opting out for class members whose
views are in conflict with those of the representative plaintiffs include Travelers Co.
v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 751, 758, 135 Cal. Rptr. 579, 584 (1977); Trotsky v.
Los Angeles Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 134, 152, 121 Cal. Rptr. 637, 648
(1975); Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1010, 117
Cal. Rptr. 485, 487 (1974). Furthermore, class size was not a significant factor for any
of these cases.
30. See 29 Cal. 3d at 473, 474, 629 P.2d at 30, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
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without compromising adequate representation. Although
numbers alone should not be determinative,"' class members
satisfied with Dart's services actually outnumbered the named
plaintiffs. The fact should at least trigger some suspicion as to
adequate representation." Indeed, the reliability in Dart of
the data establishing the amount of dissension concededly is
questionable," but the ratio itself merited more discussion
than it received. As a result, the question of when too much
dissension exists within a class will continue to plague trial
courts and attorneys. With regards to certification, however,
the adjectives used by the Dart court appear to favor the
plaintiff.84
Dart's second serious opposition to certification was that
"an inconsistency [existed] between the position of named
plaintiffs and their attorneys regarding rescission and punitive
damages."" It argued that prayers for rescission by some class
members in addition to the punitive damages sought might
seriously threaten Dart's financial stability. With its financial
stability in question, the interests of those class members who
wished to retain possession of their lots and enforce the
promises of adequate water and sewage services would be ad-
versely effected. The problem arose because of the potential
ongoing relationship between the defendant and some of the
plaintiffs; some plaintiffs were dependent upon Dart for these
services36
The court held that a decision on this potential conflict
31. For a brief case analysis of the numerosity question, see Young v. Trailwood
Lakes, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 666, 667-68 (E.D. Ky. 1974). See also Knuth v. Erie-Crawford
Dairy Coop., 395 F.2d 420, 428 (3rd Cir. 1968); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84,
91-92 (7th Cir. 1941). But see Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th
Cir. 1940) ("The court is at liberty to consider the number appearing on record as
contrasted with the number in the class. .. . There must be a sufficient number of
persons to insure a fair representation of the class."). Id. at 632. See generally 7 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1768 n.15 (1972).
32. See generally supra notes 20 & 31.
33. 29 Cal. 3d at 467-68, 475, 629 P.2d at 26, 31, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 518, 523. See
supra note 17.
34. For example, the Dart court used the following words to describe the
amount of antagonism necessary to deny certification: "widespread," "vast majority,"
"overwhelming disapproval," and "substantial degree." 29 Cal. 3d at 470-72, 474-75,
629 P.2d at 28-29, 31, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21, 523. Note also that no case precedent
is cited by the court for any of this language.
35. Id. at 475, 629 P.2d at 31, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
36. Id.
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could be made after certification." Quoting the federal case of
Tober v. Charnitta, Inc.,8 the court found instructive a hold-
ing that the threat and degree of financial instability to the
defendant would remain only speculative until the number of
those plaintiffs successfully seeking rescission could actually
be determined. Finding guidance in Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23(c) and (d),"' the Tober court held that additional
37. Id. at 477, 629 P.2d at 32, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
38. 58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
39. Below is the full text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) and (d).
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as possible after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it
is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be condi-
tional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so re-
quests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not,
will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any
member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter any
appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the
class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under sub-
division (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision
(c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the pro-
visions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Order in Conduct of Action. In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining
the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue rep-
etition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2)
requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for
the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as
the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the
action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity
of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims of defenses, or otherwise to
come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative par-
ties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to
eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons,
and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar proce-
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adjustments could be made to accommodate this or other in-
solvable conflicts by the establishment of sub-classes any time
prior to a decision on the merits.40
In so deciding, the Dart court adopted the rule estab-
lished in Tober, finding that this rule favored certification
more than the rule suggested by the defendant. The defen-
dant's rule, also established by the federal courts,"1 prevented
certification where plaintiffs sought potentially conflicting
remedies such as rescission and damages. The Tober rule was
found to be "the more prudent rule to adopt" because under
Rule 23(c) and (d) the trial court may decertify the class at a
later date should such a conflict arise.42
The philosophy of the Tober rule43 is found in earlier Cal-
ifornia cases. Citing Beckstead v. Superior Court," the court
stated that "it is preferable to defer the decision to deny class
certification until after notice has gone out and such future
time as the trial court has the most complete information at
its disposal.' 45 This rule abandons any requirement that the
trial court make a thorough searching of the facts prior to cer-
tification.'6 It shifts the trial court's focus instead to what the
dural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule
16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to
time.
128 U.S.C.A. Title 28, Rule 23 (Deering 1981).
40. Id. at 80.
41. The defendant urged the court to use the rule developed in Young v. Trail-
wood Lakes, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 666 (E.D. Ky. 1974), where the court there held demands
for both recission and damages "conceivably antagonistic goals [which] preclude ef-
fective administration as a class action." Id. at 667. Young also involved misrepresen-
tations in the sale of subdivision lots. In Dart, however, the alleged misrepresenta-
tions were in the financing arrangements. The Young court denied certification,
suggesting that the parties sue individually. Id. at 668.
42. 29 Cal. 3d at 477, 629 P.2d at 32, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
43. The rule is rooted in the intent of the authors of the amended Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, as expressed in the Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69
(1966). The general policy of the federal courts is to interpret wherever possible facts
and pleadings in favor of allowing cases to survive the pleading stage. This policy is
also inherent in the Tober rule. See United States v. Employing Plasterers' Ass'n, 347
U.S. 186, 188-89 (1954). See generally Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Com-
mittee, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967).
44. 21 Cal. App. 3d 780, 98 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1971).
45. 29 Cal. 3d at 477, 629 P.2d at 32, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
46. While the rule is in agreement with general federal and state policies, see
supra notes 1 & 43, it is very pro-plaintiff. Notice and proceedings beyond an initial
hearing on certification are costly and time consuming to all parties. The threat of
litigation might easily force concessions by potential defendants which might not oth-
erwise be made if defending parties knew they could more easily defeat a class suit in
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Chief Justice earlier noted as the state "public policy which
encourages the use of the class action device.... " Further-
more, it places upon the trial court the responsibility of main-
taining a more serious and ongoing evaluation of class status,
as the case progresses, a task not easily accomplished when
the court is involved in the other areas of the case such as
liability, massive amounts of evidence, and procedure."'
In final support of its position against certification, the
defendant presented two additional arguments. First, it al-
leged a conflict of interest on the part of the lead attorney for
the plaintiffs.4 9 This argument was dispelled rapidly by the
court because the alleged conflict of interest had ceased prior
to the motion for certification.50 Second, Dart claimed that
the plaintiffs failed to prove that either an ascertainable class
or a well-defined community of interest was present." The
court again quickly resolved this issue by applying the facts,
stating, "[t]he issue of ascertainability of the class is a rela-
tively simple matter. In this case, the record owners of the lots
at Tahoe Donner are easily identified and located."'" The
court went on to say that due to the large number of lot own-
ers involved, joinder was not practical.53 The community of
interest was found in the plaintiff's allegation that written
misrepresentations about the services promised by Dart were
given to all lot purchasers." Support for this conclusion was
found in the statutory law of California.5
The Dart court looked first to statutory language to de-
the early pleading stage. For an enlightening and scholarly defense of Rule 23, which
at the same time confesses this very result, see Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and "The Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv.
664, 672-73 (1979). See also infra note 2 for a similar comment by Judge Medina of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
47. 29 Cal. 3d at 73, 629 P.2d at 30, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
48. The requirements of the certification prerequisites are themselves often
confused with each other. See H. NEWBERG, supra note 23, § 1115(f).
49. 29 Cal. 3d at 474-75, 629 P.2d at 30-31, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23.
50. Id. at 474 n.9, 629 P.2d at 31 n.9, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 523 n.9.
51. Id. at 477, 629 P.2d at 32, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
52. Id. at 478, 629 P.2d at 33, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 525.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(b)(2)-(b)(3) (Deering 1972). It provides for
certification when "[t]he questions of law or fact common to the class are substan-
tially similar and predominate over the questions affecting the individual members"
and "[t]he claims or defenses of the representative plaintiffs are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class." Id.
554 [Vol. 22
1982] RICHMOND V. DART INDUSTRIES, INC. 555
termine what prerequisites were necessary for certification."
Although the Consumer Legal Remedies Act57 was not appli-
cable because land purchases are not considered "goods or
services" under the Act,"8 its certification requirements were
persuasive to the court because they are nearly identical to
those in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). 9 This lan-
guage, however, points only to the factual issues which are
material in the certification decision. As discussed earlier, the
language of existing case law is equally as general.10 As a re-
sult, the trial court is left to decide the question with little
more than common sense, intuition, and a general sense of
fair play as it sorts through the facts. Placing a burden with
this type of judgment-call on the trial court cannot help but
result in inconsistent decisions" because much of the basis for
certification rests in the facts, which are often unique to each
case; therefore, precedent will be difficult to develop.'
. Since the certification prerequisite of adequate represen-
tation is founded on the constitutional right of due process,0 '
56. 29 Cal. 3d at 469 n.7, 629 P.2d at 27 n.7, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 519 n.7.
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 (Deering 1972).
58. Id. § 1761(d).
59. "The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1781(b)(4). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), which pro-
vides: "The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class."
60. See supra note 34.
61. One authority stated that "4,622 rule 23 class action cases [were] pending as
of December 31, 1973." Cutler & Feeney, Challenging Certification of a Class Action:
A Hypothetical, 12 S.D. L. REv. 76, 77 n.2 (1974).
62. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 710, 433 P.2d 732, 743, 63 Cal. Rptr.
724, 735 (1967). The lack of precedent is further kindled by the tendency of defen-
dants to settle cases in order to avoid the enormous costs of litigation. As Judge Me-
dina noted, in referring to' the multitude of class actions which have been filed on
behalf of groups as numerous and diverse as all gasoline consumers, telephone users,
homeowners, and credit card users:
So far as we are aware not a single of these class actions including mil-
lions of indiscriminate and unidentifiable members has ever been
brought to trial and decided on the merits. But the preliminary . . .
mini-hearing on the merits . . . in order to decide whether or not this
case was a proper class action, and the huge and unavoidable expense of
producing witnesses and documents pursuant to discovery orders, have
brought such pressure on defendants as to induce settlements in large
amounts as the alternative to complete ruin and disaster, irrespective of
the merits of the claim.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018-19 (2nd Cir. 1973).
63. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940); City of San Jose v. Superior
Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 463, 525 P.2d 701, 712, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797, 808 (1974).
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courts must be careful not to paint with too broad a brush. An
overly receptive policy toward certification will result in a
flood of certified cases which are certain to be decertified at a
later hearing. The Dart decision may very well create an im-
pact of this sort."' The court's decision encourages certifica-
tion in the face of at least minimal evidence of a nearly insolv-
able class conflict regarding damages.as Opting out of a suit
that promises to threaten and even destroy the goal of some
class member is hardly an equitable alternative.6 Sub-classing
might also prove to be unsatisfactory, and even impossible,
without a loss spreading among all class members.6 7 Such loss
spreading may not work where some members seek an ongo-
ing relationship with a defendant threatened with bank-
ruptcy. 6 As a result, decertification may occur far into the
case, causing a loss of judicial economy and convenience to
the court and the parties. Further, since resolution of the con-
64. This speculation is based upon Chief Justice Bird's statement regarding leg-
islative policy in California coupled with the preference for the Tober rule to defer
the decertification decision. See supra note 46.
65. See supra note 17. See also Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443,
452 (M.D. Ga. 1975), appeal dismissed, 557 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1977) (actual antago-
nistic interests need not be shown; only their potentiality is necessary to deny certifi-
cation); Hess v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 482-83 (N.D. Cal. 1957)
(affidavits by other growers expressing their desire not to be represented in an action
by plaintiff was sufficient evidence to deny certification). But see Fanucchi v. Co-
berly-West Co., 151 Cal. App. 2d 72, 82, 311 P.2d 32, 39 (1957).
66. Antagonism due to class members' financial interests has been found to be a
basis for denying certification. Nelson v. United Credit Plan, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 54 (E.D.
La. 1978). When claims for compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of the class
members threaten the financial stability of the defendant, they are antagonistic to
the claims of other class members. White v. Deltona Corp., 66 F.R.D. 560 (S.D. Fla.
1975). Another court, realizing that successful litigation by the representative plain-
tiff might financially ruin the defendant, and thereby would be contrary to the goals
of other class members, rejected the opt-out alternative and refused certification.
Free World Foreign Cars Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
67. While members seeking rescission might take less for their lots, members
who wished to remain dependent on the defendant for essential services such as water
supply and sewage disposal could hardly be expected to settle for anything less than
full and adequate services.
68. Obviously a nonexistent entity cannot be depended upon for delivering such
services. Anything short of a unified effort to provide services might result in damage
being too unique to each parcel to allow certification. This would result because each
parcel is uniquely situated; distance from water and sewage hook-ups might vary, and
some lots might be situated so that installation of an individual disposal system or
water supply would be impossible. A simple formula for calculating damages to the
lots of remaining class members would be impossible. Facts such as these have been
adequate for the California Supreme Court to deny certificaiton. City of San Jose v.
Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 477, 525 P.2d 701, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974).
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flict would still be necessary, a multitude of suits may still
follow. 9
A suggested alternative would be for the court to have en-
couraged a deeper probing into the facts prior to the certifica-
tion decision, with perhaps even some fact gathering by the
court through surveys and questionnaires. Use of this method
would allow certification to remain the primary device for
controlling the advance of the case, rather than decertification
at a later date. 0
The portion of the holding which allows some antagonism
to exist within a certifiable class cements a necessary rule into
California law which is clearly in line with the expressed pol-
icy of the state legislature. It is likewise in harmony with the
spirit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and the current
trend in federal law.7 1 The antagonism in this case was one of
quantity. Unfortunately, the court failed to establish badly
needed guidelines for trial courts to employ in determining
the extent of antagonism tolerable within a certifiable class.
The court's encouragement of sub-classing is particularly dis-
tressing because in two of the precedents on which it relied
the class size was small enough for joinder to be possible.
The potential irreconcilability of alleged class differences
presented the court with a second opportunity to explore the
issue of antagonism. Rather than advocating a procedure of
early investigation when class conflict arises to allow an early
disposition of the case by noncertification, the court estab-
lished a rule encouraging initial certification. Decertification
would then dispose of the case, but only after facts later
emerged during trial. Such a rule is costly to defendants and,
in the end, may prove uneconomical to the judiciary as well.
Ernie Benck
69. This result would, of course, be contrary to the function of the class action
procedure. See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98-104 (1966). See also
Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFALO L.
REv. 433 (1960).
70. This is the desirable alternative. See supra discussion in notes 46, 61 & 67.
71. See supra federal cases cited notes 1 & 43.

PROPERTY BOUNDARIES-CIVIL CODE SECTION 830
GRANTS NONTIDAL SHOREZONE TO PRIVATE LAND-
OWNERS, SUBJECT TO TIDELANDS TRUST-State of
California v. Superior Court of Lake County (Lyon), 29 Cal.
3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981).
Raymond and Margaret Lyon, real parties in interest
[hereinafter referred to as Lyon], own 800 acres along the
shore of Clear Lake, a 64 square mile navigable body of water
in Lake County.' The original state grants, issued between
1850 and 1906, contained no description of the property's
shoreline boundary. Lyon sought to develop the property and
applied for a Fish and Game Commission permit to repair a
levee and reclaim 500 acres of marshland. The Commission
refused to process the application because the State of Cali-
fornia claimed ownership of the marsh below the high water
mark.'
Lyon, relying upon Civil Code section 830,' brought an
action to quiet title and requested a declaratory judgment.4
Section 830, enacted in 1872, provides:
Except where the grant under which the land is held in-
dicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, when
it borders on tide-water, takes to ordinary highwater
mark; when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream,
where there is no tide, the owner takes to the edge of the
lake or stream, at low-water mark; when it borders upon
any other water, the owner takes to the middle of the lake
or stream.5
The state filed a cross-complaint to quiet title in the state's
name to that portion of the property lying between high and
© 1982 by Cynthia DiGiovanni
1. State v. Superior Court of Lake County (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239,
172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981).
2. Id. at 215, 625 P.2d at 241, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
3. All references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise noted.
4. Lyon joined the Department of Fish and Game and the State Lands Com-
mission in the action. The Commission has jurisdiction over the beds of navigable
waters owned by the state or in which the state has an interest. CAL. PuB. Rzs. CODE
§ 6301 (Deering 1976).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (Deering 1971) (emphasis added).
559
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
low water and for declaratory relief. Lake County intervened
as the state's grantee in trust to the lake bed and supported
Lyon's claim of ownership.7 All parties moved for partial sum-
mary judgment.8 The trial court ruled in favor of Lyon and
the county, declaring that no portion of Lyon's property be-
tween the low and high water marks of Clear Lake belonged
to the state. In addition, the trial court decided that the pub-
lic retained navigational rights up to the high water mark, but
possessed no right to use the exposed land when the water
receded.9
The state sought a writ of mandate from the California
Supreme Court to compel the trial court to vacate its order
and to grant the state's motion for partial summary judg-
ment.10 Real estate and environmental groups, recognizing the
significance of the case's issues to the general public and pri-
vate landowners, presented extensive amicus curiae briefs.1
The Supreme Court held, with two judges dissenting, that
Lyon owned title to the shoreline property between the low
and high water marks but that his title was impressed with a
public trust, formerly limited to tidelands.'
In finding that Lyon held title to the shorezone,' 3 the
court determined that the state owned the property at one
time, 4 but that it conveyed the property to Lyon's predeces-
sors in interest' by the enactment of section 830. Lyon's first
contention was that upon admission to the Union in 1850,
California adopted the English common law as the rule of de-
cision which provided that an owner of land bordering on a
nontidal lake took to the middle of the lake." The court em-
6. 29 Cal. 3d at 215, 625 P.2d at 242, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 699.




11. Briefs in support of the state were filed by the Department of Water Re-
sources, the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council (joint brief) and
the Audubon Society and the Friends of the Earth (joint brief). Briefs in support of
Lyon were filed by the California Land Title Association and the California Associa-
tion of Realtors (joint brief), and the Upper San Joaquin River Association. 29 Cal.
3d at 216 n.3, 625 P.2d at 242 n.3, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 699 n.3.
12. Id. at 226, 231, 625 P.2d at 248, 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
13. "Shorezone" refers to the area between high and low water mark.
14. 29 Cal. 3d at 222, 625 P.2d at 246, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
15. Id. at 225, 625 P.2d at 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
16. Id. at 216-18, 625 P.2d at 242-43, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
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barked on a lengthy examination of the English common law
rules which governed land ownership in 1850.' Ownership of
bodies of water turned on whether the waters were navigable;
in order to protect the public's interest in navigation and
commerce, all navigable bodies of water belonged to the King,
whereas non-navigable rivers and lakes belonged to the bor-
dering individual landowners. The terms "navigable" and
"tidal" were synonymous under the common law since, in
mid-19th century England, only tidal waters were in fact navi-
gable."' In the United States, however, many nontidal bodies
of water were navigable. This geographical difference ac-
counted for much of the confusion over the effect of the adop-
tion of the common law in the United States.'9
Finding that Lyon entirely overlooked the problem of the
common law's application to California, the court reviewed
prior authority on the issue. It noted that as early as 1851 the
United States Supreme Court recognized the inapplicability
of the common law rules to conditions in the United States
20
and emphasized that our courts have always exercised their
independence in choosing which doctrines to follow based on
suitability to local conditions.2
The court employed section 830 to further justify its re-
jection of the common law rule regarding shorezone owner-
ship. If, the court reasoned, in following the common law rule
a littoral or riparian landholder in 1850 owned nontidal waters
to the middle of the lake or stream, section 830's enactment in
17. The court reasoned that, even accepting Lyon's assertion that the state did
not automatically gain title to the beds of navigable waters upon achieving statehood
but only had the option to make such a claim, it was compelled to find that the state
had succeeded to title because the new state had not declined to exercise sovereign
ownership of such lands. Id. at 217-18, 625 P.2d at 243, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
18. Id. at 218-19, 625 P.2d at 243-44, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 218, 625 P.2d at 244, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 701, citing The Propeller Gene-
see Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454-58 (1851) (the federal government
had admiralty jurisdiction in rivers and lakes which were navigable in fact, whether
or not they were subject to tides). See also American Water Co. v. Amsden, 6 Cal.
443, 446 (1856) (tidal character of a body of water was not a proper test of navigabil-
ity); McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1 (1856) (only those parts of the common law
suitable to conditions in Iowa were adopted by the new state). Other states recog-
nized the inapplicability of the English rule to conditions in this country prior to
1850; see Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 484-86 (Pa. 1810).
21. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 220, 625 P.2d at 244-45, 172 Cal. Rptr.
at 701-02, citing Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136, 142-43 (1857); Traynor, Statutes Re-
volving in Common Law Orbits, 43 CAL. ST. B.J. 509 (1968).
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1872 constituted a taking of his property, as it declared that
he henceforth only owned to the low water mark. The court
declined to follow this "entirely irrational conclusion" 2 and
determined that upon admission to the union the state gained
title to the lands between the high and low water mark on
navigable nontidal bodies of water.2 3
Lyon's second contention was that section 830 granted
the shorezone on navigable lakes to the adjacent private land-
owners.2 ' The court reviewed prior decisions and concluded
that while they contained dicta on the question of whether
section 830 constitutes a grant of property, they did not con-
tain any direct holdings on the issue.25 The case law was am-
biguous, but the court noted that administrative interpreta-
tion of the section was consistently clear: until 1970 the state
had taken the position that it owned the property only up to
the low water mark.26 The court added that two other states
interpreted similar statutes as grants of property. Relying
heavily on the long history of administrative interpretation,
the court concluded that section 830 constituted a conveyance
and that Lyon, therefore, owned title of the property down to
Clear Lake's low water mark.2
Lyon further asserted that he held title to the low water
mark free of any public interest because nontidal navigable
waters were not subject to a public trust.28 Rather, Lyon
claimed (as the trial court ruled) that only the waters covering
the shorezone were impressed with a recreational or naviga-
tional easement, and that when the water receded the public
had no right to use the exposed land.2 9 The court took the
opportunity to reaffirm two earlier cases: (1) Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois,8o described as "the seminal case on
the scope of the public trust doctrine,"'" which established
22. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 221, 625 P.2d at 245, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
702.
23. Id. at 222, 625 P.2d at 246, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
24. Id. at 217, 625 P.2d at 243, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
25. Id. at 223, 625 P.2d at 246, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
26. Id. at 224, 625 P.2d at 247, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
27. Id. at 225-26, 625 P.2d at 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
28. Id. at 226, 625 P.2d at 249, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
29. Id.
30. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
31. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 227, 625 P.2d at 249, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
706.
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navigability as the test for determining whether the public
trust doctrine applied to a body of water; and (2) Marks v.
Whitney, 2 which expanded the public's tidelands trust rights
to include the right to hunt, bathe or swim, and the right to
preserve the tidelands in their natural state. 3 The court
stated, "[w]e hold that the same incidents of the trust appli-
cable to tidelands also apply to nontidal navigable waters and
that the public's interest is not confined to the water, but ex-
tends also to the bed of the water." 4 Further, the court found
nothing in the language of section 830 which it could construe
to be a grant to landholders free of the public's right."' There-
fore, it concluded that Lyon's title to thi property between
the high and low water marks was impressed with the public
trust6
Lyon finally contended that a determination finding the
property subject to a public trust constituted a taking of pri-
vate property in violation of federal and state constitutional
provisions.37 The court expeditiously dismissed this argument.
It responded that its holding constituted less of an interfer-
ence with property rights than resulted from prior decisions,
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois," People v. California
Fish Co., 9 and City of Berkeley v. Superior Court,40 which
involved outright grants of land deemed to be revocable be-
cause the conveyances were made in disregard of the public
32. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
33. Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796, citing Colberg, Inc. v.
State ex. rel. Dep't Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 421-22, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1967) as stating that changing public needs require the state to be flexible in ad-
ministering the trust and defining public uses to which tidelands are subject.
34. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 231, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
708. Lyon argued that regarding the public's rights, tidal and nontidal waters should
be treated differently; since tidal waters are inundated daily, the necessity of reserv-
ing the shorezone for public use is far more important than impressing nontidal wa-
ters with the public trust. However, the court could "discern no valid reason why the
scope of the public's right in nontidal waters should not be equally broad" as those
enumerated for tidal waters in Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374,
380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971).
35. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 231, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
708.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 231, 625 P.2d at 251-52, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
38. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
39. 166 Cal. 576, 596, 138 P. 79 (1913).
40. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
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trust.4 The court emphasized that Lyon was free to utilize
the lands between low and high water in any manner compati-
ble with the public's interest in the property.42
In a dissenting opinion, Justices Clark and Richardson
disagreed with the majority holding on the point of applying
the tidelands trust to nontidal shorezone. In their view,
"[a]pplication of the trust doctrine to the shorezone is con-
trary to California public policy. .. [which] has been to en-
courage reclamation, farming and residential use of these
properties."'48 Clark and Richardson based their dissent on an
"environmental overkill" argument. They maintained that
protecting parts of the shorezone is a valid objective but that
"it should not be accomplished with a blunderbuss that con-
fiscates . . . perhaps millions of titles and jeopardizes existing
use of millions of acres of residential and farm lands."4 4
For the first time, a California court squarely confronted
a nontidal navigable water boundary question. The most sig-
nificant implication of Lyon is the court's interpretation of
section 830 as a grant of nontidal shorezone to private land-
owners. Prior to Lyon, interpretation of section 830 came
from case dicta. In City of Los Angeles v. Aitken,45 for exam-
ple, the court, citing section 830, assumed that the title of a
private landholder extended to the low water mark of a navi-
gable nontidal lake.4" Administrative practice formed the only
direct interpretation of section 830. State authorities, includ-
ing the Attorney General, took the position until 1970 that by
virtue of section 830 the state claimed ownership only to the
low water mark. 7 In a trial in 1970 involving a condemnation
action on the Feather River, however,48 the Attorney General
reversed his position and thereafter contended that the state
owned to the high water mark.4 Presented with the legal con-
41. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 232, 625 P.2d at 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
709.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 238, 625 P.2d at 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
44. Id.
45. 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (1935).
46. Id.
47. See 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 291, 295 (1964); 30 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 262, 269
(1957); 23 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 306, 307 (1954); 23 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 97, 98 (1954).
48. People v. Shasta Pipe and Supply Co., (Butte County Sup. Ct. No. 37390).
49. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 224-25, 625 P.2d at 247, 172 Cal. Rptr.
at 704. For a discussion of the confusion over the interpretation of § 830 resulting
from the lack of court authority and the reversal in administrative interpretation, see
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fusion surrounding the shorezone boundary, the Lyon court
chose to remove the cloud on the title of riparian and littoral
landowners throughout the state.50 The court cited the one
hundred year history of administrative interpretation as its
principal basis for declaring section 830 a grant of the
shorezone to private landowners.
The second most important implication of Lyon is the
court's holding that the tidelands trust doctrine applies to
lakes and rivers.5 1 This doctrine, with roots in Roman law,
was incorporated into early American law. Often referred to as
the "public navigational easement," the trust reserved the
public's right in navigation and commerce and until recently
was limited to use of the water.02 Illinois Central Railroad Co.
v. Illinois," the most cited case on the American tidelands
trust, concerned a 1,000 acre grant of Lake Michigan's bed by
the State of Illinois to the Illinois Central Railroad. The
United States Supreme Court held that the tidelands trust
doctrine applied to the navigable nontidal Great Lakes, rea-
soning that "the doctrine is founded upon the necessity of
preserving to the public the use of navigable waters [free]
from private interruption and encroachment, a reason as ap-
plicable to navigable waters as to waters moved by the tide.""
Lacking any California precedents on the nontidal shorezone
trust issue, the Lyon court relied heavily on the reasoning of
Illinois Central in applying the trust doctrine to nontidal wa-
ters.8 8 The California Supreme Court, in Marks v. Whitney,56
expanded the scope of the public's right in tidelands beyond
commerce and navigation to include the right to hunt, bathe,
Arnone, The Extent of State Ownership of Submerged Lands in.California, 31 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 329 (1979); Comment, California Civil Code Section 830: A Rule of Prop-
erty Needed for the Protection of the Private Landowner, 9 PAC. L.J. 1011 (1978);
and Comment, Need for a Uniform Public-Private Boundary: Application of the
High Water Boundary to Inland Navigable Lakes, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 125 (1979).
50. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 225, 625 P.2d at 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
705.
51. Id. at 231, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
52. Davis, California's Tideland Trust: Shoring It Up, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 759
(1971).
53. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
54. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 228, 625 P.2d at 249, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
706 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 at 436-37).
55. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 228-31, 625 P.2d at 249-51, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 706-08.
56. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
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or swim, and the right to preserve tidelands in their natural
state. Thus, in light of Lyon, these additional rights of pub-
lic use extend to nontidal navigable shorezone.
The leading California decision on the power of the state
to convey public trust lands to private parties free of the trust
is People v. California Fish Co.8 s In California Fish, the court
held that unless a conveyance was made for the purpose of
furthering trust goals, the grantee took title subject to the
rights of the public." California Fish further established
guidelines for the interpretation of statutes authorizing tide-
land grants; legislative intent to abandon public use must be
clearly expressed or necessarily implied. 0 In the recent case of
City of Berkeley v. Superior Court,61 the California Supreme
Court re-emphasized both California Fish tests and overruled
two previous decisions which had interpreted an 1870 statute
as an absolute tidelands grant.6 2 The Lyon court, in determin-
ing whether section 830 constituted an absolute nontidal
shorezone grant, examined the statute's language pursuant to
California Fish and City of Berkeley. It found no express or
implied legislative intent to abandon public use of the non-
tidal shorezone.6
A California Supreme Court opinion, State of California
v. Superior Court of Placer County (Fogerty)6 (published on
the same date as Lyon) presented similar issues but raised an
additional question of whether the state may be estopped
from asserting title to or public interest in the shorezone 65
Fogerty involved a dispute over ownership of Lake Tahoe's
shorezone where landowners had built piers or docks to low
water. The court stressed a principle of estoppel doctrine pre-
viously stated in City of Long Beach v. Mansel:" "[eistoppel
will not be applied to the government if the result would be to
57. Id. at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
58. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
59. Id. at 596, 138 P. at 87. See also City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d
462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970) for consolidation of subsequent cases.
60. 166 Cal. 576, 597, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913).
61. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
62. Id.
63. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 231, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
708.
64. 29 Cal. 3d at 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1981).
65. Id. at 244, 625 P.2d at 259, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
66. 3 Cal. 3d 462, 493, 476 P.2d 423, 445, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 45 (1970).
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nullify a strong policy adopted for the benefit of the public."'67
The Fogerty court concluded that protection of the fragile
shorezone constituted a strong public policy which precluded
an estoppel against the state." However, the court noted that
if improvements previously constructed on the trust lands by
landowners were found to be incompatible uses that must be
removed, the landowners were entitled to just compensation."
It is curious that a Civil Code section relating to bounda-
ries between state and private land ownership existed over a
hundred years without judicial interpretation.7 0 Recent pres-
sure to develop valuable lakeside property focused attention
on section 830 for the first time.7 ' Lyon clearly answered the
question of title but left several practical problems in its
wake.
The first problem concerns enforcement of the public
trust." Lyon confers upon the State Lands Commission the
delicate task of establishing trust management guidelines. Cri-
teria for use by the private landowners and the logistics of
public use will undoubtedly evolve from future lawsuits
brought by the state, private citizens and shorezone landown-
ers. The compatible use problem could have been avoided by
declaring section 830 an invalid grant of trust lands in keeping
with the well-settled California Fish principle. 3 Perhaps
afraid of widescale inverse condemnation repercussions, the
court chose not to overturn what it saw as the established ad-
ministration of section 830,/ but instead created another
67. State v. Placer County, 29 Cal. 3d at 244, 625 P.2d at 259, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
716.
68. Id. at 244-47, 625 P.2d at 259-60, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17. The court dis-
cussed public recognition of the need to protect the state's shorezone as a valuable
wildlife habitat, for a scientific study area and for flood protection.
69. Id. at 249, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
70. 9 PAC. L.J. 1011, supra note 49.
71. Id.
72. The legislature administers the tidelands trust, with management opera-
tions delegated to the State Lands Commission. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 6301 (West
1977). Assuming that enforcement of the nontideland trust will be the same as for
tidelands, actions for trust violations can be brought by (1) the state to abate inter-
ference with its management of the trust; and (2) by private citizens, as beneficiaries
of the trust, when the state fails to act. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576,
599, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913). See also Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98
Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971) where a member of the public was granted standing to request
the court to declare a parcel of shorezone property subject to the public trust.
73. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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monster: privately owned land, managed by a public
agency-a land manager's nightmare of conflicts between pri-
vate rights, public use and environmental constraints.
Another issue left in the wake of Lyon concerns
shorezone access. There is a vast difference between having a
license to use the shorezone and having access provided to it.
Questions arise as to whether the state will have to purchase a
trail easement from Lyon in order to give the public marsh-
land access other than by boat. Alternatively, public dedica-
tion of access easements through large developments border-
ing on the shorezone could be required as part of the
California Environmental Quality Act environmental impact
mitigation.
Lyon perhaps creates more problems than it solves, but it
represents an important step toward judicial recognition of
the public's interest in recreational lands and protection of
the state's dwindling natural environments. Its impact ex-
tends far beyond Clear Lake to the state's 4,000 miles of
shoreline along thirty-four navigable lakes and thirty-one nav-
igable rivers.7 5 Private landowners no longer exclusively con-
trol the shorezone, but hold it in trust for public recreation
and open space.
Cynthia M. DiGiovanni
75. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 216, 625 P.2d at 242, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
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THE END OF THE FORMAT DOCTRINE-PUBLIC
HEARINGS ON CHANGES IN ENTERTAINMENT FOR-
MATS NEED NOT BE HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH
APPLICATIONS TO TRANSFER OR RENEW RADIO
BROADCAST LICENSES-FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild,
450 U.S. 582 (1981).
The Communications Act of 19341 provides that the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) may
grant an application for a radio broadcast license transfer or
renewal' only upon a finding that the public interest, conve-
nience, and necessity would be served thereby.3 In FCC v.
WNCN Listeners Guild,4 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether particular circumstances may
exist in which the FCC must examine past or prospective
changes in a radio station's entertainment format when the
Commission rules on an application to renew or transfer a ra-
dio broadcast license.' The Court decided that neither the
© 1982 by Marshall A. Scarr Jr.
1. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (originally enacted
as Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064).
2. Under 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976), broadcast licenses must be renewed every
three years.
3. The 1934 Act provides:
Subject to the provisions of this section, the Commission shall deter-
mine in the case of each application filed with it to which section 308 of
this title applies, whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity
will be served by the granting of such application, and, if the Commis-
sion, upon examination of such application and upon consideration of
such other matter as the Commission may officially notice, shall find
that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by the
granting thereof, it shall grant such application.
47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976). The 1934 Act further provides in pertinent part:
No construction permit or station license, or any rights thereunder, shall
be transferred, assigned, or disposed of in any manner, voluntarily or
involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or by transfer of control of any cor-
poration holding such permit or license, to any person except upon ap-
plication to the Commission and upon finding by the Commission that
the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby.
47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1976).
4. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
5. The Court stated: "The issue before us is whether there are circumstances in
which the Commission must review past or anticipated changes in a station's en-
tertainment programming when it rules on an application for renewal or transfer of a
radio broadcast license." Id. at 584-85.
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public interest, convenience, nor necessity required the FCC
to examine such format changes. It held that changes in en-
tertainment format in conjunction with the renewal or trans-
fer of a radio broadcast license do not warrant public
hearings.
The case of FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild arose in the
procedural context of a review of a Federal Communications
Commission "Policy Statement" which was issued in 1976.7
The primary basis for the Policy Statement was the FCC's
conclusion that the forces of the marketplace provide the best
means of insuring the public's interest through a diverse and
healthy radio industry.' This decision led the Commission to
conclude that "a program of regulation would not be compati-
ble with our statutory duty to promote the public conve-
nience, interest and necessity."
In 1977, the Commission refused to reconsider its Policy
Statement.o Reconsideration was denied despite the fact that
the Commission was forced to stay the effectiveness of its pol-
icy." The policy was not implemented because it was clearly
contrary to the holding of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v.
FCC.1 2
The WEFM decision represented the final development
6. Effectively, this was the Court's holding. In actuality, the Court merely re-
versed the court of appeals. The court of appeals had prohibited the FCC from mak-
ing a blanket policy of refusing in all cases to examine format changes relative to
license transfers or renewals. Id. at 593.
7. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976) (Policy State-
ment), reconsideration denied, 66 F.C.C.2d ,78 (1977). Congress provided that the
FCC "from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires shall
* .* [m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions,
not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out provisions of this chap-
ter." 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976). Pursuant to this rulemaking authority, the FCC released
the Policy Statement.
8. 60 F.C.C.2d at 863.
9. Id. at 864.
10. 66 F.C.C.2d at 78.
11. Id. at 85.
12. 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The refusal to reconsider the Policy State-
ment, 66 F.C.C.2d at 85, indicated the Commission's intention not to review format
changes when licenses were renewed or transferred. In WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246
(1974), the court of appeals ordered the commission to hold a public hearing as part
of a review of an assignment of radio broadcast license which involved a format
change. The Commission obeyed the order of the court of appeals in WEFM but
issued the Policy Statement which opposed the position that the court of appeals had
taken in its format doctrine.
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of the format doctrine18 by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals. 14 The format doctrine was a set of guidelines outlin-
ing certain circumstances 8 when the FCC must hold a public
hearing on the loss of a unique format occasioned by the
transfer or renewal of a radio broadcast license.1 e The format
doctrine indicated that it would not be in the public interest
to approve a license transfer or renewal where a unique and
financially viable format would be lost.17
Following the Commission's refusal to reconsider its pol-
icy of not examining format changes,18 a number of citizen
groups, 19 including the WNCN Listeners Guild, petitioned for
a review of the Policy Statement.20 The petition was submit-
ted before the same court of appeals which had issued the se-
ries of cases which formed the format doctrine.1
13. The term "format doctrine" popularly refers to the rules developed by the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals to govern the regulation of format
changes in broadcasting. The term was used as early as 1976 in the FCC's Notice of
Inquiry, 57 F.C.C.2d 580 (1979). For background on the development of this doctrine,
see Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Citizens
Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lakewood
Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens Comm. to
Preserve the Voice of the Arts in Atlanta v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See
also Hartford Communications Comm. v. FCC, 467 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
14. WNCN Listener's Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
15. The court of appeals outlined the limited circumstances when public hear-
ings would have to be held under the requirements of the format doctrine. The doc-
trine obligated the FCC to consider format issues only when strong prima facie evi-
dence indicates that the market has in fact broken down.
No public interest issue is raised if (1) there is an adequate substitute in
the service area for the format being abandoned, (2) there is no substan-
tial support for the endangered format as evidenced by an outcry of
public protest, (3) the devotees of the endangered format are too few to
be served by the available frequencies, or (4) the format is not
financially viable.
Id. at 842-43.
16. Id. at 841.
17. Id.
18. 66 F.C.C.2d at 78.
19. Seeking review in addition to the WNCN Listeners Guild were the following
groups which the court of appeals indicated were all interested in fostering and pre-
serving distinctive entertainment formats: Classical Radio for Connecticut, Inc., Com-
mittee for Community Access, the Office of Communications of the United Church of
Christ, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Latino Me-
dia Coalition, National Council of La Raza, Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass
Media, American G.I. Forum, and Public Communication, Inc., 610 F.2d at 841.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 842 n.2.
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In WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC,2 the court of appeals
questioned whether the Commission had rationally and im-
partially reviewed the position it had maintained in WEFM.'s
The court criticized the Commission2 ' and questioned the
FCC's exaggerated view of the administrative problems which
the Commission claimed would arise out of the review of those
radio broadcast license transfers or renewals involving format
changes.25 The appellate court succinctly restated the limited
circumstances under which its earlier holdings would require a
public hearing. Noting that public hearings aid in the deter-
mination of whether a transfer or renewal is in the public in-
terest,26 the court held en banc that the FCC's policy state-
ment was contrary to the intent of the Communications Act of
1934.27
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice White, reversed the court of ap-
peals' judgment.26 The Court held that the FCC's Policy
Statement is a constitutionally permissible means of imple-
menting the Communications Act's public interest require-
ment within the meaning of the first amendment and that the
Policy Statement is not inconsistent with the Communica-
tions Act.
First, the Court reasoned that the Commission ade-
quately explained its finding that the marketplace promotes
diversity in entertainment formats. Second, it stated that the
Commission deserves great deference in its judgment on how
to best implement the Act's public interest standard. Third,
the Court found that the legislative history of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 does not provide a sufficient basis to jus-
tify the appellate court's notion that public interest requires
22. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
23. 610 F.2d at 846.
24. The court of appeals sharply criticized the Commission for its failure to dis-
close a technical staff document for public comment. The staff study was the basis for
the Commission's policy statement conclusion that the marketplace provides the best
means to allocate entertainment formats in radio. The court of appeals indicated that
the failure to release the staff study for public comment not only diminished the
assurance that the Commission's conclusion was accurate, but also raised questions of
procedural fairness. Id.
25. Id. at 848.
26. Id. at 838.
27. Id.
28. 450 U.S. at 593. Justice White was joined in the majority opinion by Jus-
tices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger.
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format regulation.2 9
While the Communications Act calls for a finding that
the public interest, convenience, and necessity be served to
justify the grant of an application,"0 it fails to define the terms
"public interest, convenience and necessity."'
The court of appeals and the FCC agreed that the public
interest is served by promoting diversity in entertainment for-
mats.2 Diversity has two major forms, inter-format and intra-
format. This division is just the beginning of the myriad of
categories which are likely to be created in an attempt to ac-
curately describe the variety of formats presently extant in ra-
dio. The concept of diversity and efforts to promote it are fur-
ther befuddled by an inability to measure the strength of the
public's preference for one format over another." The con-
sumer's cost is the same regardless of radio station or format
listened to. Therefore, no market price method is available to
accurately register the degree of a consumer's preference.3
The variety of formats available to the public, in a given
radio market, is largely subsidized by advertisers who, in turn,
pass their costs indirectly to the public. The "marketplace" is,
thus, unnatural and flawed, open neither to free competition
(the number of competitors is regulated) nor to preference
voting by price.36 The FCC admitted in its Policy Statement
29. Id. at 594.
30. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).
31. While the public interest is not defined, the majority notes, without agree-
ing or disagreeing with the court of appeals, that "preservation of a format [that]
would otherwise disappear, although economically and technologically viable and pre-
ferred by a significant number of listeners, is generally in the public interest." 450
U.S. at 586 (citing Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 268 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)). See 450 U.S. at 593-94 for more information on public considerations.
32. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976) (Policy State-
ment); WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
33. Brief for Petitioner app. § IV, FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582
(1981).
34. Under general economic analysis, the more a consumer prefers a given prod-
uct or service, the more he or she is willing to pay for it. Thus, the item which sells at
a higher price is preferred (over less costly similar items) by that purchaser. Eco-
nomic theorists, unlike lawyers, expect the common man to be rational, although not
necessarily reasonable.
35. Listener preferences are not irrelevant. Radio market research firms poll the
public to see what percentage of the listening population a radio station has at given
periods throughout the day. The results of these surveys are then sold to radio sta-
tions who use them to help convince advertisers that their station's commercial air
time is worth the rates they seek to charge. Thus, radio stations attempt to gain a
larger market share so that they can charge higher rates and increase their income.
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that market forces are not perfect6 The entire Court agreed
that, in general, the marketplace has done an adequate job of
producing diversity in entertainment formats. They disagreed,
however, about what to do if the market is not diverse or if it
does not meet the public's interest, convenience or necessity.
The majority found the arguments in the FCC's Policy
Statement persuasive. The primary assertion made in the
statement was that regulation to ensure the public interest in
diverse entertainment formats is an elusive and difficult task.
Every format is different and it is, therefore, impossible to de-
termine if one listener's preference is stronger than another
listener's preference for a certain format. Each format is
"unique" and the loss of any given format in an area may or
may not benefit the public.3
In WNCN Listeners Guild, the Court stated that
[t]he Commission is convinced that its judgments in these
respects would be subjective in large measure and would
only approximately serve the public interest. The Court
also is convinced that the market, although imperfect,
would serve the public interest as well or better by re-
sponding quickly to changing preferences and by inviting
experimentation with new types of programming.86
The majority deferred to the FCC's pronouncements be-
cause "Congress had granted the Commission broad discre-
tion"89 in determining how "to secure the maximum benefits
of radio to all the people of the United States. '40 The Court
found the Policy Statement to be constitutional. Moreover,
the Court determined that the FCC's arguments were ration-
ally based and were consistent with the legislative history of
the 1934 Communications Act.41 In addition, the majority
held that although the Court's previous "fairness doctrine 42
From the economic and statistical perspective, a survey of a portion of the audience
less accurately depicts the entire consumer population, than a situation where every
listener must pay to listen to the radio station he prefers.
36. 60 F.C.C.2d at 863.
37. 450 U.S. at 601.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 594.
40. Id. (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217
(1943)).
41. 450 U.S. at 597.
42. Id. at 603 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969)).
[Vol. 22574
FCC V. WNCN LISTENERS GUILD
emphasized a listener's first amendment right to "receive suit-
able access to social, political, aesthetic, moral and other ideas
and experience,"" this right was not directly applicable in
this case. The Court explained that a first amendment right
does not extend to entertainment formats in the form of a
right to have a review hearing before a broadcaster can aban-
don a listener's favorite format during a sale or renewal of a
station's broadcast license."
Justice Marshall, dissenting, agreed with the FCC and the
majority that the market generally does an adequate job of
ensuring that the public interest is met." Justice Marshall,
however, presented issues which the majority failed to ad-
dress. He disagreed with the FCC's claim, in its Policy State-
ment and in its brief, that the court of appeal's format doc-
trine was a system of pervasive governmental regulation.'
Clearly, this was not the case. In explicit language the court of
appeals stated that the format doctrine applied only in a few
limited circumstances where there was strong prima facie evi-
dence that the marketplace was functioning inadequately. 7
Justice Marshall observed that the Policy Statement
"lacks the flexibility we have required of such general regula-
tions.""' He indicated, but did not explicitly state, that the
public has an interest in what entertainment is offered."9
The Commission is required in every license application
for a renewal or transfer to "exercise an ultimate judgment
whether the grant of a license would serve the 'public interest,
convenience or necessity.' "5o The view contained in the Policy
Statement that the market will adequately provide diversity
and public benefit creates an absolute "hands off" policy
which the dissent found inconsistent with the FCC's statuto-
rily imposed duties.
The majority stated that no holding has ever explicitly
prohibited the FCC from adopting a rule which is without a
43. 450 U.S. at 603.
44. Id. at 604.
45. Id. at 606 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. 610 F.2d at 851.
48. 450 U.S. at 608.
49. Id. at 611-13.
50. Id. at 609 (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 225 (1943)).
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waiver provision, i.e., a "safety valve."51 The issue has never
been presented directly to the Court. As the dissent notes,
however, many "cases have indicated that an agency's discre-
tion to proceed in complex areas through general rules is inti-
mately connected to the existence of a 'safety valve' procedure
that allows the agency to consider applications for exemp-
tions."52 The dissent found the " 'safety valve' feature particu-
larly essential where, as here, the agency's decision that a gen-
eral policy promotes the public interest is based on
predictions and forecasts that by definition lack complete fac-
tual support." 3
Justice Marshall commented that a flexibility require-
ment would provide a procedure by which listeners could
demonstrate to the Commission that the market forces in
their area are not working as the Commission's paradigm sug-
gests.' Since Congress gave the FCC the duty to ensure the
public interest," logically the public should have a right to
explain what its interest is. Even the dissent, however, stops
short of asserting that the public has a right to address the
Commission, even in those limited circumstances where there
is prima facie evidence that the market has actually broken
down."
The dissent was concerned with the apparent retreat by
the FCC from its 1960 Program Statement.' 7 This Statement
stressed the licensee's obligation to continually attempt "to
discover and fulfill the tastes, needs, and desires of his service
area."'
8
The Commission's retreat from its earlier position has
51. 450 U.S. at 601 n.44.
52. Id. at 612 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 771-72
(1968); Fed. Power Comm. v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1964); United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 204-05 (1956); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 207, 225 (1943). See also Wait Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d
1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969); American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (en banc), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966); WBEN Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968).
53. 450 U.S. at 611 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. 47 U.S.C. § 309.
56. 450 U.S. at 606-07.
57. Id. at 612-13 (discussing Report and Statement of Policy Res.: Commission
en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960)).
58. Report and Statement of Policy Res.: Commission en banc Programming
Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2312 (1960)).
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been limited to entertainment formats and does not extend to
"non-entertainment" formats. 9 Unless it is assumed that the
public has no interest in entertainment programming, it is dif-
ficiult to comprehend the Commission's policy of reviewing
non-entertainment programming while refusing to review en-
tertainment programming. There is an absence of a rational
basis for distinguishing entertainment from non-entertain-
ment programming in the Commission's Policy Statement. e0
The distinction in this case is critical. Under the Policy State-
ment approved in FCC v. WNCN, the right of an individual
or group of listeners to demand a hearing concerning a format
change, when a license is renewed or transferred, wholly de-
pends upon whether the format is deemed to be entertain-
ment or non-entertainment. 1 A determination of whether a
given format is entertainment or non-entertainment also de-
termines non-reviewable from reviewable programming.
Justice Marshall commented on the irony of the Commis-
sion's claim that it is impossible to devise a useful mechanism
for classifying formats. The FCC relies upon a staff study
which classified formats in order to show that adequate diver-
sity is provided by market forces. Neither the FCC or the ma-
jority explained why a format classification system is consid-
ered to be a sufficient and reliable source on which to base a
general policy and why, on the other hand, the same system is
considered to be inadequate for the purpose of classifying for-
mats where a license is being transferred or renewed." Never-
theless, the Court and the FCC agreed that a general policy
may be based on a format classification study which demon-
strates market diversity even though the policy does not allow
a "safety valve" hearing process."
59. 450 U.S. at 613. In the past when deciding whether or not to grant a trans-
fer or renewal, the FCC has looked into the adequacy of non-entertainment program-
ming provided by the licensee. See Channel 20 Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 1770 (1979) (chil-
drens programming); Central Calif. Com. Corp., 70 F.C.C.2d 1947 (1979) (service to
Spanish-American communities); Mississippi Auth. for Educ. Television Comm'n, 71
F.C.C.2d 1296 (1979) (service to black communities).
60. 450 U.S. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. It is difficult to imagine what value free criteria can be used which permits
the Commission to "grasp, measure and weigh . . . elusive and difficult factors" in
non-entertainment, but not in entertainment, formats. Id. at 617 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
62. Id. at 619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 618-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The safety valve hearing situation
would only arise where, in addition to other circumstances, there is vociferous public
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FCC v. WNCN exemplifies a growing national trend to-
ward conservative policies regarding transfer or renewal of ra-
dio broadcast licenses. From this perspective, it is not surpris-
ing that the Court supported the FCC's claim that market
forces will adequately provide for the public interest. The
FCC's retreat from its Policy of 1960,64 which demanded that
broadcasters serve the local community's "tastes and needs,"6
is not an isolated example of the FCC's efforts to relax its
regulations.
By upholding the Commission's recent Policy Statement,
the Supreme Court apparently condones the FCC's deregula-
tion of radio stations. The Commission's Notice of Inquiry
and Proposed Rule Making, In the Matter of Deregulation of
Radio" and the Report and Order, In the Matter of Deregu-
lation of Radio7 illustrate this trend.
The wisdom of the Commission's deregulation in an im-
perfect marketplace cannot be properly judged for many
years. Congress knew that the airwaves' limited nature pre-
vents a truly open and competitive marketplace. Conse-
quently, Congress created a Commission with oversight power.
In FCC v. WNCN, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's
policy that the best entertainment format regulation is no reg-
ulation. The court of appeals' attempt to delineate a workable
guideline to determine when a public hearing should be held
has been abandoned. The Supreme Court, in FCC v. WNCN
Listeners Guild,68 held that the commission need not hold a
hearing to review a proposed entertainment format change
when a station is applying for a renewal or transfer of a radio
broadcast license. As a result, the Supreme Court settled the
dispute about how to best serve the public interest: conve-
nience and necessity.
Marshall A. Scarr Jr.
outcry. See supra text at note 15.
64. 44 F.C.C. at 2303.
65. 450 U.S. at 613.
66. 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979).
67. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888 (1981) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. §§ 0 & 73).
68. 450 U.S. at 582.
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